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THE "INSANE" CONTRADICTION OF Singleton v. Norris: FORCED
MEDICATION IN A DEATH Row INMATE'S MEDICAL INTEREST WHICH
HAPPENS TO FACILITATE His EXECUTION
I. INTRODUCTION
[Ildiots and lunatics are not chargeable for their own acts, if committed
when under these incapacities: no, not even for treason itself. Also, if a
man in his sound memory commits a capital offence, and before arraign-
ment for it, he becomes mad, he ought not to be arraigned for it: because
he is not able to plead to it with that advice and caution that he ought. And
if after he has pleaded, the prisoner becomes mad, he shall not be tried:
for how can he make his defence? If, after he be tried andfound guilty, he
loses his senses before judgment, judgment shall not be pronounced; and
if after judgment, he becomes of nonsane memory, execution shall be
stayed: for peradventure, says the humanity of the English law, had the
prisoner been of sound memory, he might have alleged something in stay
ofjudgment or execution.'
Ever present and alive in the United States, the death penalty and
the issues surrounding its execution continue to be at the forefront of
ethical debate. Currently on the table in Arkansas is the issue of forced
medication which facilitates a death row inmate's execution. For years,
the states have prohibited execution of the insane, with the United States
Supreme Court mandating the same in Ford v. Wainwright.2 But the
Court's decision still leaves the question of what should be done with
death row inmates who are mentally ill. Should the state allow an
insane man to suffer from his mental illness, or should it medicate him,
subjecting him to death?
Recently, the Arkansas Supreme Court made this decision for all
mentally ill Arkansas death row inmates who require forced medication.
In Singleton v. Norris,3 the Court held that it is permissible for the state
to force medication upon a mentally ill death row inmate even if the
collateral effect of the medication is the facilitation of his execution. It
is questionable whether the Singleton decision comports with prior
decisions of the United States Supreme Court surrounding the forcible
medication issue.
Although the legal community might have assumed that this
quandary had been resolved after the state decisions in Louisiana v.
1. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399,406-07 (1986) (quoting 4 W. BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *24-*25).
2. 477 U.S. 399(1986).
3. 338 Ark. 135, 992 S.W.2d 768 (1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 808 (2000).
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Perry4 and Singleton v. South Carolina,' holding respectively that the
states of Louisiana and South Carolina cannot forcibly medicate an
inmate solely to facilitate his execution, any such assumptions are
misguided. The Arkansas Supreme Court's recent decision on the issue
gives cause to ponder the law surrounding the forcible medication to
execute issue.
This comment will attempt to examine that law as it now exists and
the ramifications of the Singleton decision for the future. Part II provides
a brief synopsis of the history andjustifications for the death penalty, as
well as the development of and reasoning behind the prohibition against
execution of the insane. Part Ill examines the caselaw surrounding the
forced medication issue relating to prisoners and its application to death
row inmates. Part IV analyzes the Arkansas Supreme Court's decision
in Singleton, and Part V concludes that the Arkansas decision may in fact
call into question the State of Arkansas's overall ability to force
medication upon death row inmates pursuant to Washington v. Harper.6
Ii. PHILOSOPHY OF THE DEATH PENALTY AND ITS APPLICATION TO
MENTALLY ILL DEATH Row INMATES
The death penalty has long existed in the United States, recorded as
early as 1608 in Jamestown Colony; each of the colonies punished
crimes against the state, person, and property by public hanging.' Even
with the adoption of the Eighth Amendment prohibiting cruel and
unusual punishment, capital punishment survived; it was thought that
the amendment only prohibited extreme forms ofthe death penalty, such
as "crucifixion or burning at the stake."' The death penalty continues
to be a traditional form of punishment in thirty-eight states9 with the
4. 610 So. 2d 746 (La. 1992).
5. 437 S.E.2d 53 (S.C. 1993).
6. 494 U.S. 210(1990).
7. See Hugo Adam Bedau, Background and Developments, in THE DEATH PENALTY
IN AMERICA: CURRENT CONTROVERSIES 3, 3 (Hugo Adam Bedau ed., 1997).
8. Id. at 4.
9. See Kristen Wenstrup Crosby, Comment, State v. Perry: Louisiana's Cure-to-
Kill Scheme Forces Death-Row Inmates to Choose Between a Life Sentence of Untreated
Insanit and Execution, 77 MINN. L. REV. 1193, 1193 (1993); Laurence A. Grayer, Against
the Global Trend: Support for the Death Penalty Continues to Expand Within the United
States, 7 INT'L LEGAL PERSP. 1, 10 (1995); Henry Schwarzschild, The Death Penalty in the
United States: A Commentary and Review, 22 AM. J. CRIM. LAW 247, 247 (1994). Twelve
states (Alaska, Hawaii, Iowa, Maine. Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, North
Dakota, Rhode Island, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wisconsin) plus the District of
Columbia do not have the death penalty. See Death Penalty Information Center, State
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exception of a few states abolishing it in the 1900s." Opinion polls
demonstrate that the majority of Americans have supported its use in the
past; however, the numbers decrease when the inquiries are more
specific about how the death penalty should be applied and whether, as
a juror, one would support a sentence of death."
Death penalty advocates commonly cite retribution and deterrence
to support its invocation.' 2 One commentator submits the death penalty
also incapacitates individuals from committing subsequent offenses. 3
Today, however, this punishment applies not only to the rationally
minded, but to mentally ill inmates on death row as well.
Many death row inmates will become mentally ill or incompetent
after serving time on death row due to the stressors involved.'4 Some
inmates who enter the system with pre-existing mental conditions find
those conditions are exacerbated by the harsh environment of death
row. 5 Others with no previous mental illness develop mental disorders
by State Death Penalty Information (visited Mar. 28, 2000)
<http://www.essential.org/dpic/firstpage.html#Notes>.
10. The few states to abolish the death penalty during the 1900s did so as a part of
the "movement to abolish the death penalty by state legislative reform." Bedau, supra
note 7, at 8. Those states abolishing the death penalty completely included Arizona,
Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, North Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota, Tennessee, and
Washington. See Bedau, supra note 7, at 8.
11. See Douglas Mossman, M.D., The Psychiatrist and Execution Competency:
Fording Murky Ethical Waters, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1, 12-13 (1992).
12. See David L. Katz, Note, Perry v. Louisiana: Medical Ethics on Death Row-Is
Judicial Intervention Warranted?, 4 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 707, 709 (1991). Katz defines
retribution as "restoring a previously existing equilibrium 'to what it had been before
the offensive behavior had been committed."' Id. (quoting Wolfgang, The Medical
Model Versus the Just Deserts [sic] Model, 16 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 111, 113
(1988)). Deterrence "is the act or process of discouraging others from acting in a
similar behavior." Id.
13. See Jack P. Gibbs, Preventive Effects of Capital Punishment other than Deterrence,
in THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 103, 106 (Hugo A. Bedau ed., 1982). Incapacitation
is defined as "keeping a particular killer from killing again." Phoebe C. Ellsworth &
Samuel R. Gross, Hardening of the Attitudes: Americans' Views on the Death Penalty, in
THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA: CURRENT CONTROVERSIES, supra note 7, at 90, 98.
14. See Keith Alan Byers, Incompetency, Execution, and the Use of Antipsychotic
Drugs, 47 ARK. L. REV. 361, 367 (1994).
15. See Robert M. Harding, "Endgame: " Competency andthe Execution of Condemned
Inmates-A Proposal to Satisfy the Eighth Amendment's Prohibition Against the Infliction of
Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 14 ST. LouIs U. PUB. L. REV. 105, 114 (1994). Professor
Harding cites Michael Perry as an example of an individual whose "reality has
continued to be negatively affected" after starting out in the system with mental
deficiencies and severely deteriorating following his incarceration. Id. at 114-15
(discussing Michael Perry of State v. Perry, 610 So.2d 746 (La. 1992), discussed infra
Part Ill.B.!). Also of interest to those in Arkansas, Professor Harding points to Ricky
Ray Rector as another death row inmate who entered with a mental illness and
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upon incarceration on death row. 16 The stressors affecting these death
row inmates are numerous:
[lI]t has been stated that "[o]ne of the least common and possibly the
most stressful of all human experiences is the anticipation of death at
a specific moment and time and in a known manner." In addition to
the stress accompanying the knowledge of looming death, the very
nature of being on death row places an individual in a position where
he is more susceptible to becoming incompetent. Specifically, "death
row inmates generally experience social isolation and a lack of
exercise, education, and work programs; family visits are infrequent
and burdened with security restrictions."'1
7
Even though it has deemed the death penalty acceptable for
retribution and deterrence purposes, the United States Supreme Court
has placed some limitations on its use, especially as it concerns mentally
ill death row inmates.'8 The most profound limitation on its use is the
prohibition of using the death penalty against an insane person.'9 Courts
have historically justified the prohibition in several ways: (1) the
execution of the incompetent "offends general notions of humanity," (2)
execution of a "madman does not successfully achieve deterrence," (3)
an incompetent person cannot "'suffer' for committing the crime"
because of his inability to understand the punishment, (4) religious
beliefs, and (5) the belief that a mentally ill person is "punished by his
madness alone. 2 ' However rationalized, this prohibition brings forth
deteriorated after incarceration. See id. at 115 (discussing Ricky Ray Rector of Rector
v. Clark, 923 F.2d 570 (8th Cir. 1991), whose mental illness was indicated by the fact
that he shot himself in the head prior to trial).
16. See id.
17. Byers, supra note 14, at 367-68 (internal citations omitted). Professor Harding
notes one study in which inmates exhibited upon condemnation the following
tendencies: "suspicious[ness]," "grandiose[ness]," "progressive[] depress[ion]," and
"paranoi[a] after being incarcerated on death row." Harding, supra note 15, at 115
(quoting Harvey Bluestone, M.D., & Carl L. McGahee, M.D., Reaction toExtreme Stress:
Impending Death by Execution, 119 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 393 (1962)).
18. See Rhonda K. Jenkins, Comment, Fit to Die: Drug-Induced Competencyfor the
Purpose of Execution, 20 S. ILL. U. L.J. 149, 151 (1995).
19. See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986). The prohibition against
executing the insane existed prior to the decision in Ford, stemming from the English
common law. See Eric M. Kniskern, Does Ford v. Wainwright's Denial of Executions of
the Insane Prohibit the State from Carrying Out Its Criminal Justice System?, 26 S.U. L. REV.
171, 179 (1999).
20. Harding, supra note 15, at 110- 12. The United States Supreme Court also cited
several reasons for prohibiting the execution of the insane in its opinion in Ford v.
Wainwright. Specifically, Justice Marshall stated that this bar was necessary because
execution of the insane "ha[d] been branded 'savage and inhuman,"' served as no
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another issue: "[W]hether a state can force an incompetent inmate to
take medication that would render him competent to be executed," the
very question addressed in Louisiana v. Perry and Singleton v. South
Carolina.2' Further still is the question posed to the Arkansas Supreme
Court in Singleton v. Norris: whether the state can force medication upon
a death row inmate for reasons other than making the inmate competent
to be executed when the collateral effect is that the inmate becomes
competent to be executed while on the medication.
In answering these questions, the Louisiana, South Carolina, and
Arkansas supreme courts have turned to three significant United States
Supreme Court decisions for guidance. These Supreme Court cases
addressed whether or not one can execute an insane person, whether it
is a violation of a prisoner's rights to forcibly medicate him against his
will, and whether forced medication during trial violates a defendant's
rights. These Supreme Court decisions are fundamental to understand-
ing inmates' rights and the lower courts' decisions.
Ill. LEADING CASES AT THE INTERSECTION OF MENTAL HEALTH AND
CRIMINAL LAW
A. The Early Cases-Ford, Harper, and Riggins
1. Ford v. Wainwright
In Ford v. Wainwright,22 the United States Supreme Court upheld
what had already been the practice in many states for some time23-the
example to others, offended humanity, disallowed the offender the chance to become
"ready" religiously, and because the insanity served as its own punishment. Ford, 477
U.S. at 406-07.
21. Mossman, supra note 11, at 6.
22. 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
23. See id. at 40 1. The Court noted that it was "keep[ing] faith with our common-
law heritage" by formally prohibiting execution of the insane. Id. Each of the fifty
states proscribes execution of the insane. See Kniskem, supra note 19, at 179.
Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-90-506(d)( I) outlines Arkansas's procedure for
dealing with a death row inmate suspected to be incompetent:
When the Director of the Department of Correction is satisfied that there are
reasonable grounds for believing that an individual under sentence of death
is not competent, due to mental illness, to understand the nature and reasons
for that punishment, the director shall notify the Deputy Director of the
Division of Mental Health Services of the Department of Human Services.
The Director of the Department of Correction shall also notify the Governor
of this action. The Division of Mental Health Services shall cause an inquiry
to be made into the mental condition of the individual within thirty (30) days
2000] 663
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prohibition of executing prisoners suffering from insanity. 24 In support
of its conclusion that the Eighth Amendment prohibits execution of an
insane prisoner, the Court noted the historical underpinnings of its
position, particularly that such an execution violates the Eighth
Amendment protection against cruel and unusual punishment.25 For
of receipt of notification. The attorney of record of the individual shall also
be notified of this action, and reasonable allowance will be made for an
independent mental health evaluation to be made. A copy of the report of
the evaluation by the Division of Mental Health Services shall be furnished
to the Division of Mental Health Services of the Department of Correction,
along with any recommendations for treatment of the individual. All
responsibility for implementation of treatment remains with the Division of
Mental Health Services of the Department of Correction.
(A) If the individual is found competent to understand the
nature of and reason for the punishment, the Governor shall
be so notified and shall order the execution to be carried out
according to law.
(B) If the individual is found incompetent due to mental
illness, the Governor shall order that appropriate mental
health treatment be provided. The director may order a
reevaluation of the competency of the individual as
circumstances may warrant.
ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-506(d)(1) (Michie Supp. 2000).
24. Although the courts in their opinions regarding the death penalty frequently use
the terms interchangeably, there is. in fact, a substantial difference between the legal
terms "competency" and "insanity." Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-2-302
addresses incompetency at the time of trial, also known as lack of fitness to proceed:
"No person who, as a result of mental disease or defect, lacks capacity to understand
the proceedings against him or to assist effectively in his own defense shall be tried,
convicted, or sentenced for the commission of an offense so long as such incapacity
endures." ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-302 (Michie Repl. 1997). Insanity at the time of the
crime, or lack of capacity, is set forth in Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-2-312:
(a) It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution that at the time the defendant
engaged in the conduct charged, he lacked capacity, as a result of mental
disease or defect, to conform his conduct to the requirements of law or to
appreciate the criminality of his conduct.
(b) As used in this code the terms "mental disease or defect" do not include
an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial
conduct.
(c) When a defendant is acquitted on grounds of mental disease or defect the
verdict and judgment shall so state.
ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-312 (Michie Repl. 1997). Consequently, one could be insane
when he committed the offense, but competent to understand the proceedings at trial.
As it applies to the context at hand, Ford dictates that the insane person cannot be
executed because he cannot understand the punishment, completely co-mingling the
two concepts of insanity and incompetence. For an excellent review of the terms and
their meanings and application to Arkansas law, see J. Thomas Sullivan, Psychiatric
Defenses in Arkansas Criminal Trials, 48 ARK. L. REV. 439 (1995).
25. The Eighth Amendment provides in its entirety: "Excessive bail shall not be
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."
664 [Vol. 22
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instance, the Court stated that Blackstone deemed the practice of
executing the insane "savage and inhuman." '26 In discussing various
commentators' suggestions on the subject, the Court noted Sir Edward
Coke's opinion that execution of a" mad man" is a "miserable specta-
cle," violative of law, "of extream [sic] inhumanity and cruelty," and
serves no example to mankind.27 The Court concluded that a prisoner
petitioning a state court under habeas corpus must be afforded a
factfinding procedure "adequate to afford a full and fair hearing"28 to
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
26. Ford, 477 U.S. at 406 (citing 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *24-*25).
27. Id. at 407 (quoting 3 H. COKE, INSTITUTES (6th ed. 1680)). The Court continued:
Other commentators postulate religious underpinnings: that it is uncharitable
to dispatch an offender "into another world when he is not of a capacity to
fit himself for it." Hawles 477. It is also said that execution serves no
purpose in these cases because madness is its own punishment: furiosus solo
furore punitor. Blackstone *395. More recent commentators opine that the
community's quest for "retribution"-the need to offset a criminal act by a
punishment of equivalent "moral quality"-is not served by execution of an
insane person, which has a "lesser value" than that of the crime for which he
is to be punished. Hazard & Louisell, Death, the State, and the Insane: Stay
of Execution, 9 UCLA L. Rev. 381, 387 (1962). Unanimity of rationale,
therefore, we do not find. "But whatever the reason of the law is, it is plain
the law is so." Hawles 477. We know of virtually no authority condoning
the execution of the insane at English common law.
Ford, 477 U.S. at 407-08 (footnote omitted).
Justice Powell, in his concurring opinion in Ford, provided additional
commentary regarding the differing theories behind the prohibition of executing the
insane. See id. at 418 (Powell, J., concurring). First, Justice Powell discussed the
theory that such a prohibition was necessary to preserve a defendant's ability to defend
himself. See id. at 419 (Powell, J., concurring) (citing I M. HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN
35 (1736) and 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *388-*389). Justice Powell dismissed
this first theory as having little merit today because of the modem protections afforded
defendants, such as the right to effective assistance of counsel at trial and upon appeal,
as well as the right to trial itself, and the notion that a defendant must be competent
before being tried. See id. at 420-21 (Powell, J., concurring). The second theory behind
the prohibition was one supported by "humanitarian concerns." Id. at 419 (Powell, J.,
concurring). Justice Powell suggested that this second theory is the sustaining reason
behind the prohibition today. See id. at 421 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell
noted that one of the standards behind the state's goal in execution is that the prisoner
know and understand why the execution is occurring. See id. at 422 (Powell, J.,
concurring). Hence Justice Powell would have held that "the Eighth Amendment
forbids the execution only of those who are unaware of the punishment they are about
to suffer and why they are to suffer it." Id. (Powell, J., concurring).
28. See Ford, 477 U.S. at 418. Doctor David Shapiro suggests that a psychologist's
participation in a Ford hearing could violate the American Psychological Association's
Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of Conduct. David L. Shapiro, Ethical
Dilemmas for the Mental Health Professional: Issues Raised by Recent Supreme Court
Decisions, 34 CAL. W. L. REV. 177, 192-93 (1997). Specifically, Shapiro notes that
Standard 1.14 calls on psychologists to "'avoid harm'. . . . If one believes that
20001
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determine the question of competence to be executed.29 Additionally,
the Court stated that any hearing not providing the defendant or his
counsel with an opportunity to present relevant information regarding
his sanity, or precluding the consideration of such information, would
violate due process.
30
2. Washington v. Harper
In acase extremely pertinent to Singleton v. Norris, the United States
Supreme Court addressed the issue of forcing medication upon prisoners
in Washington v. Harper." In Harper, the Court found that the inmate has
"a significant liberty interest in avoiding the unwanted administration
of antipsychotic drugs under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment."32
executing another human being is harm, then participating in such evaluations at all
could be seen as a violation of Standard 1.14." Id. Standard 1.14 states:
"Psychologists take reasonable steps to avoid harming their patients or clients, research
participants, students, and others with whom they work, and to minimize harm where
it is foreseeable and unavoidable." AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION, ETHICAL
PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGISTS AND CODE OF CONDUCT § 1. 14, at 5 (1992).
29. Ford, 477 U.S. at 418. The Court held that Florida's statute did not provide
such an "adequate" determination. See id.
30. See id. at 414. For Arkansas's provisions, see supra note 23.
31. 494 U.S. 210(1990).
32. Id. at 221-22. The Fourteenth Amendment provides in part:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
The Court noted that forced medication substantially interferes with a prisoner's
liberty:
The purpose of the drugs is to alter the chemical balance in a patient's brain,
leading to changes, intended to be beneficial, in his or her cognitive
processes. While the therapeutic benefits of antipsychotic drugs are well
documented, it is also true that the drugs can have serious, even fatal, side
effects. One such side effect identified by the trial court is acute dystonia,
a severe involuntary spasm of the upper body, tongue, throat, or eyes....
Other side effects include akathesia (motor restlessness, often characterized
by an inability to sit still); neuroleptic malignant syndrome (a relatively rare
condition which can lead to death from cardiac dysfunction); and tardive
dyskinesia, perhaps the most discussed side effect of antipsychotic drugs.
Tardive dyskinesia is a neurological disorder, irreversible in some cases, that
is characterized by involuntary, uncontrollable movements of various
muscles, especially around the face.
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After determining that the "reasonable relation" test was the proper
standard to apply in evaluating the state's interest,33 the Court held that
"the Due Process Clause permits the State to treat a prison inmate who
has a serious mental illness with antipsychotic drugs against his will, if
the inmate is dangerous to himself or others and the treatment is in the
inmate's medical interest., 34 The Court went on to hold that decisions
regarding the medical interests of the prisoner, such as the decision to
medicate, are best decided by members of the medical profession, rather
than the judiciary."a
3. Riggins v. Nevada
Finally, in Riggins v. Nevada,36 the United States Supreme Court
examined whether "forced administration of antipsychotic medication
during trial violated rights guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments. 37 In its analysis, the Court reiterated its earlier holding
in Harper that forced medication interferes with an individual's liberty,
with the result that due process permits forcing medication onto inmates
only upon a showing of dangerousness to self or others and medical
Harper, 494 U.S. at 229-30 (internal citations omitted).
33. See Harper, 494 U.S. at 223. Namely, the regulation must be "reasonably
related to legitimate penological interests." Id. (citing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78,
89 (1987)). The Court noted that in Turner it deemed this standard applicable to any
case in which the "needs of prison administration implicate constitutional rights." Id.
at 224. To determine whether the challenged regulation was reasonable, the Court
outlined three factors defined in Turner: (I) whether there is a rational connection
between the regulation and the governmental interest, (2) what impact the constitutional
right will have on prison officials and other inmates, and (3) the lack of other
alternatives. See id. at 224-25. In Harper, the Court stressed that the state's interest in
prison safety must be considered. See id. at 223.
34. Id. at 227 (emphasis added). In his concurrence, Justice Blackmun offered an
interesting solution-he suggested that in appropriate cases the mentally ill prisoner be
committed, presumably to a state mental institution, to better protect the prisoner and
the prison staff and population, as well as the state and its physician. See id. at 236-37
(Blackmun, J., concurring).
35. See id. at 231. Indeed, two doctors profess that the opposite is occurring.
Doctors Alfred M. Freedman and Abraham L. Halpern suggest that psychiatrists are
being torn professionally between their traditional ethical principles and pressure from
"certain segments of the legal profession." Alfred M. Freedman, M.D. & Abraham L.
Halpern, M.D., The Erosion of Ethics and Morality in Medicine: Physician Participation in
Legal Executions in the United States, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 169, 181-82, 186 (1996)
(citing Barbara A. Ward, Competency for Execution: Problems in the Law and Psychiatry,
14 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 35, 68-99 (1986)).
36. 504 U.S. 127 (1992).
37. Id. at 132-33.
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appropriateness." s Relying on these requirements, the Court stated that
once Riggins requested that his medication be terminated, the state was
then obligated to make the Harper showings before continuing forcible
medication.39 Because the State had failed to make such a showing, the
Court reversed Riggins's case and remanded it.4" The Court based its
decision on the fact that the side effects4 of the forced medication42 may
have impacted Riggins's appearance, his testimony, his "ability to
follow the proceedings," or his interactions with his counsel.43 Such
effects, the Court noted, could impair Riggins's constitutionally
protected trial rights."
This trilogy of cases left open a pressing issue which the United
States Supreme Court has yet to address: whether a state may medicate
a prisoner to competency thereby facilitating his execution. To date,
38. See id. at 134-35 (citing Harper, 494 U.S. at 227, 229).
39. See id. at 135. The necessary but undemonstrated showings were that (1)
"antipsychotic medication was medically appropriate" and (2) "essential" for Riggins's
and others' safety. See id.
40. See id. at 138.
41. The Court's record included information that the dosage of Mellaril given to
Riggins could make him "uptight," might cause drowsiness or confusion, and possibly
akinesia, which affects thought processes in extreme cases. See Riggins, 504 U.S. at
137.
42. In Riggins's case, Mellaril was the forced medication used. See id. at 129.
PDR.net specifies that Mellaril is used to treat psychotic disorder symptoms, as well
as adult depression and anxiety. Its side effects may include:
[a]bnormal and excessive secretion of milk, agitation, anemia, asthma,
blurred vision, body spasm, breast development in males, changed mental
state, changes in sex drive, chewing movements, confusion (especially at
night), constipation, diarrhea, discolored eyes, drowsiness, dry mouth,
excitement, eyeball rotation, fever, fluid accumulation and swelling,
headache, inability to hold urine, inability to urinate, inhibition of
ejaculation, intestinal blockage, involuntary movements, irregular blood
pressure, pulse, and heartbeat, irregular or missed menstrual periods, jaw
spasm, loss of appetite, loss of muscle movement, mouth puckering, muscle
rigidity, nasal congestion, nausea, overactivity, painful muscle spasm,
paleness, pinpoint pupils, protruding tongue, psychotic reactions, puffing of
cheeks, rapid heartbeat, redness of the skin, restlessness, rigid and masklike
face, sensitivity to light, skin pigmentation and rash, sluggishness, stiff,
twisted neck, strange dreams, sweating, swelling in the throat, swelling or
filling of breasts, swollen glands, tremors, vomiting, weight gain, [and]
yellowing of the skin and whites of eyes[.]
PDR.net, PDR Family Guide to Prescription Drugs (visited Mar. 28, 2000)
<http://www.pdr.net/comsumer/psrecord.htm?NS doc offset=0+NS doc returned=
12&NS_advsearch=0+NS searchset=lvaOPXdTZe 1022b809aaf)2&NS -template_
dir=&NS initial frml>.
43. Riggins, 504 U.S. at 137.
44. See id. The Court noted that an essential state interest could justify trial
prejudice, but that in the case at hand, there was no basis. See id. at 138.
668 [Vol. 22
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three states have confronted this issue: Louisiana, South Carolina, and
Arkansas.
B. Forced Medication Solely to Facilitate Execution-Perry and
Singleton
I. Louisiana v. Perry
The Supreme Court of Louisiana was the first state supreme court
to address whether the state could force medication upon a prisoner
against his will to attain his competency in order to execute him.45
Specifically, the court examined whether the state could "circumvent"
the "prohibition against execution of the insane" in order to execute
Michael Owen Perry."6 Perry had been diagnosed with schizophrenia at
the age of sixteen and had been committed to mental institutions on
several occasions due to psychotic symptoms.47 Following his commit-
ment and treatment pursuant to a sanity commission's recommendation,
Perry was found competent to stand trial, withdrew his insanity plea,
pled not guilty, and was convicted of five counts of murder.48 He was
later found competent to be executed only if medicated.49
45. See State v. Perry, 610 So. 2d 746 (La. 1992). The United States Supreme
Court had vacated the trial court's original order and remanded the case for
reconsideration in light of Harper. See id. at 748. After the trial court reinstated the
forcible medication order, the Louisiana Supreme Court granted certiorari and rendered
its decision. See id. The Court noted that Perry was unquestionably insane and
incompetent for execution absent antipsychotic drugs. See id. at 749.
46. Id. at 747. The Louisiana Constitution provides for a right to privacy in Article
1, section 5:
Every person shall be secure in his person, property, communications,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches, seizures, or
invasions of privacy. No warrant shall issue without probable cause
supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, the persons or things to be seized, and the lawful purpose or reason
for the search. Any person adversely affected by a search or seizure
conducted in violation of this Section shall have standing to raise its
illegality in the appropriate court.
LA. CONST. art 1, § 5. The state's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment can
be found in Article 1, section 20: "No law shall subject any person to euthanasia, to
torture, or to cruel, excessive, or unusual punishment. Full rights of citizenship shall
be restored upon termination of state and federal supervision following conviction for
any offense." LA. CONST. art. I, § 20.





The Supreme Court of Louisiana stated that any circumvention of
the prohibition would violate a prisoner's rights under the state's
constitution by violating the right to privacy and by constituting cruel
and unusual punishment as it "fails to measurably contribute to the
social goals of capital punishment."5 The court discussed Ford, noting
that "the practice of executing the insane is thrice barred in [this] state,
i.e., by the state and federal constitutions and by the decisions of this
court."'" Next the court distinguished Harper on the grounds that
forcibly medicating to facilitate execution is not medical treatment, "but
[that it] is antithetical to the basic principles of the healing arts."'52 The
Louisiana Supreme Court also noted that the state had failed to make the
necessary showings dictated by Harper,53 and that Harper itself implied
that forcible medication could not be used for punishment.54
In examining the medical ethics of "drugging for execution,"" the
court found that any actions by the state solely for that purpose could
not be construed as medical treatment.56 For a doctor to administer
medication solely to facilitate a prisoner's competency for the purpose
of execution would be unethical and "contrary to the goals of medical
treatment."57 As a result, these unethical actions actually prevent the
50. See id. at 747.
51. Id. at 750.
52. Jd. at 751.
53. See Perry, 610 So.2d at 751. Specifically, the court noted that Harper requires
a state to show that its regulation "rationally seeks to further both the best medical
interest of the prisoner and the state's own interest in prison safety before it may inject
a prisoner with antipsychotic drugs against his will," and that the state in this case had
failed to show either. Id.
54. See id. at 75 1-52. In contrasting the goal of the state in Harper (to forcibly
medicate a prisoner in his own best interest) with that of the state in Perry (to medicate
in order to implement execution), the Louisiana Supreme Court remarked "in the
present case, the state's involuntary use of drugs on Perry must be vindicated if at all
as a procedure that legitimately forms part of his capital punishment. It cannot be
justified under Harper because forcible administration of drugs to implement execution
is not medically appropriate." Id. at 754.
55. See id. at 752. Some suggest that the reason that physicians encounter the
drugging-to-execute issue more frequently than in the past is because of recent
pharmacological successes and the increased population of"condemned insane." Katz,
supra note 12, at 712-13.
56. See Perry, 610 So.2d at 752.
57. Id. The court explained:
If any physician administers drugs forcibly and thereby enables the state to
have the inmate declared competent for execution, the doctor knowingly
handles the prisoner harmfully and contrary to his ultimate medical interest.
The physician's abstention from dispensing the drugs, however, perpetuates
suffering that ordinarily the physician is duty-bound to allay by treatment.
If the drugs are forcibly administered by a person who is not a physician,
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prisoner from obtaining appropriate medical treatment. 8 The court
concluded that forced medication solely to facilitate competency to
execute fails to be medical treatment, but instead becomes part of the
state's capital punishment. 9
Additionally, the court noted that because Harper stood forthe
premise that "overriding justification and a determination of medical
appropriateness" must be found in order to forcibly medicate, the Harper
what occurs is devoid of any pretense of medical treatment or compliance
with the principles of medical ethics. Therefore, the forcible medication of
a prisoner merely to improve his mental comprehension as a means of
rendering him competent for execution actually prevents the prisoner from
receiving adequate medical treatment for his mental illness.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
Doctor Robert T.M. Phillips points out that the Council on Ethical and Judicial
Affairs of the American Medical Association issued the following guidance in a recent
report regarding situations where a prisoner has been declared incompetent to be
executed: "[P]hysicians should not treat the prisoner to restore competence unless a
commutation order is issued.... [However, ijfthe incompetent prisoner is undergoing
extreme suffering as a result of psychosis[,] . . . medical intervention intended to
mitigate the level of suffering is ethically permissible." Robert T.M. Phillips, The
Psychiatrist as Evaluator: Conflicts and Conscience, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 189, 199
(1996) (quoting COUNCIL ON ETHICAL & JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, AMERICAN MED. ASS'N,
Physician Participation in Capital Punishment: Evaluations of Prisoner Competence to be
Executed: Treatment to Restore Competence to be Executed, CEJA Report 6-A-95, at 4
(1995)). For those interested, the 1998 movie Dead Man Out, starring Danny Glover and
Ruben Blades, depicts the dilemma faced by a psychiatrist whose goal is to make a
prisoner competent to execute.
58. See Perry, 610 So. 2d at 752.
59. See id. at 753. The court noted several effects of the "forcible medicate-to-
execute structure:"
First, the patient's autonomy rights are violated because he is not permitted
to weigh the benefits and risks of a proposed course of treatment in
consultation with his physician as is required in seeking the patient's best
medical interest.... Second, the forcible nature and lethal repercussions of
the state's involuntary antipsychotic drug regimen preclude a trustful,
communicative doctor-patient relationship that is essential to psychiatric
therapy.... Third, since the physician cannot serve two masters, there is a
substantial concern that the patient's well-being may be subordinated to the
duty the doctor owes the state.... Fourth, for all of the foregoing reasons,
and because of the incompatibility of the interests of the state and the
prisoner, both of which the physician is required to further, the death penalty
is apt to be implemented arbitrarily and capriciously. . . . Fifth, a
psychiatrist's administration of involuntary medication may constitute being
"a participant in a legally authorized execution" contrary to the ethical code
of the American Medical Association, as adopted and interpreted by the
American Psychiatric Association. . . . Sixth, blurring the distinction
between healing and punishing denigrates the "deep-seated social interest in
preserving medical care, in actuality and in perception, as an unambiguously
beneficent healing art."
Id. at 752-53 (internal citations omitted).
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holding was inapposite to Perry.6 Inasmuch as Louisiana's purpose in
medicating Perry was solely to facilitate his execution, the court found
that it was different from Nevada's goal in Harper which was to
medicate Harper in his medical interest.6' Consequently, the court
deemed Louisiana's real goal in Perry to be his capital punishment
rather than medical treatment and the state's objective of medicating to
execute was not justifiable under Harper because it was not "medically
appropriate."62
2. Singleton v. South Carolina
The next case to examine the medicate-to-execute issue was
Singleton v. South Carolina.6' However, the South Carolina Supreme
Court only examined the issue after considering the applicable standard
for competency for execution." Noting that Ford did not set forth the
standard,65 the court proceeded through a common law analysis and
adopted a "slightly modified standard ... which satisfies the mandates
of federal due process, the common law, and the South Carolina
Constitution. " Regarding forced medication to attain competency, the
court examined and dismissed Harper and Riggins as being inapplicable
because although they outlined the federal due process considerations,
they failed to address South Carolina's constitutional question. 67
Instead, the South Carolina Supreme Court looked to Perry for
guidance.6" Noting the Louisiana court's reliance on its state constitu
60. Id. at 753-54.
61. See id. at 754.
62. See id.
63. 437 S.E.2d 53 (S.C. 1993).
64. See id. at 55.
65. See id. at 56.
66. Id. at 57-58. Specifically, the court adopted a two-prong analysis to determine
competency for execution:
The first prong is the cognitive prong which can be defined as: whether a
convicted defendant can understand the nature of the proceedings, what he
or she was tried for, the reason for the punishment, or the nature of the
punishment. The second prong is the assistance prong which can be defined
as: whether the convicted defendant possesses sufficient capacity or ability
to rationally communicate with counsel.
Id. at 58. In the court's view, Singleton in no way met this standard for competency.
See id.
67. See id. at 60 (citing Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127 (1992) (examining the
issue of forced medication at trial, discussed supra Part IlI.A.3)).
68. See id. South Carolina's right to privacy is defined as:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons. houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures and unreasonable
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tion's protection of the right of privacy, the South Carolina court
followed Louisiana's lead. The court held that the South Carolina
constitution provision against invasions of privacy was "strikingly
similar" to Louisiana's, and when weighed with Harper's due process
inquiry, any sanction by the state to force medication "solely to facilitate
execution" would violate the inmate's right to privacy.69 The court
continued in its opinion, quoting the Hippocratic Oath"° and examining
the "thorny issue" of the "medical profession's ethical standards.'
Specifically, the court remarked that both the American Medical Society
and the American Psychiatric Associations oppose physician participa-
tion in the "legally-authorized execution of a prisoner. 7 Finally, the
court pronounced a strong statement: "[W]e find that justice can never
invasions of privacy shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but
upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, the person or thing to be seized, and the
information to be obtained.
S.C. CONST. art. 1, § 10.
69. Singleton, 437 S.E.2d at 61. The court did note that the inmate has a "very
limited" privacy interest when considered in comparison to the state's prison safety
interest; "however, the inmate must be free from unwarranted medical intrusions." Id.
70.
I swear by Apollo the physician, by Aesculapius, Hygeia, and Panacea, and
I take to witness all the gods, all the goddesses, to keep according to my
ability and my judgment the following Oath: ... I will prescribe regimen for
the good of my patients according to my ability and my judgment and never
do harm to anyone. To please no one will I prescribe a deadly drug, nor give
advice which may cause his death..... I will preserve the purity of my life
and my art.... In every house where I come I will enter only for the good
of my patients, keeping myself far from all intentional ill-doing ....
Hippocrates c. 460-400 B.C., STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 647 (4th Unabridged
Lawyer's Ed. 1976) (quoted in State v. Perry, 610 So.2d 746, 752 (La. 1992)). For the
complete text of the Hippocratic Oath, see Compton's Encyclopedia Online (visited Mar.
28, 2000) <http://www.optonline.com/comptons/ceo/03090.028_X.html>. The Oath
is "the central document, the most often-cited summary of the physician's own
understanding of what is morally required to be a good medical doctor." Katz, supra
note 12, at 714 (quoting R. VEATCH, A THEORY OF MEDICAL ETHICS 18-19 (198 1)).
71. Singleton, 437 S.E.2d at 61.
72. Id. The court explained: "Their reasoning is the causal relationship between
administering a drug which allows the inmate to be executed, and the execution itself.
They opine that the administration of the drug is responsible for the inmate's ultimate
death." Id. (citing AMA Opinion 2.06 (prohibiting a physician from participating in a
legally authorized execution)); see generally Donald H. Wallace, Incompetency for
Execution: The Supreme Court Challenges the Ethical Standards of the Mental Health
Professions, 8 J. LEGAL MED. 265 (1987); AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, The
Principles of Medical Ethics: With Annotations Especially Applicable to Psychiatry §1(4)
(1985); Capital Punishment, Proc. House Delegate AMA 85 (1980)).
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be served by forcing medication on an incompetent inmate for the sole
purpose of getting him well enough to execute."73
IV. SINGLETON v NORRIS--THE ARKANSAS INTERPRETATION
In the most recent case to examine the issue of medication
facilitating execution, Singleton v. Norris,74 the Arkansas Supreme Court,
in effect, ignored both the Louisiana and South Carolina decisions that
had examined the forcible medication/execution issue. Instead, the
Arkansas Supreme Court conducted its own analysis, seemingly
ignoring an important prong in the two-part test set out in Harper.
Charles Singleton was convicted of murder in 1979 and sentenced
to death."5 After receiving psychiatric treatment for several years,
Singleton voluntarily ceased taking his prescribed antipsychotic
medication in 1997.76 In July 1997, Doctor Oglesby, a psychiatrist with
the Arkansas Department of Corrections, found that Singleton was again
psychotic, suffering from delusions and paranoid schizophrenia.77
Subsequently, a Medication Review Panel allowed his psychiatrist to
forcibly medicate him with the drugs Prolixin and Cogentin." During
73. Id. at 62.
74. 338 Ark. 135, 992 S.W.2d 768 (1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 808 (2000).
75. See id. at 136, 992 S.W.2d at 769. Singleton is one of thirty-nine inmates
currently on death row in Arkansas. See Arkansas Department of Corrections: Inmates on
Deathrow (visited Mar. 13, 2000) <http://www.state.ar.us/doc/death.htm>.
76. See Singleton, 338 Ark. at 136, 992 S.W.2d at 769.
77. See Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Under Authority of 28 U.S.C. § 2241
at 9, Singleton v. Norris (Feb. II, 2000) (No. 5:00CV00043 GTE).
78. See id.; Singleton, 338 Ark. at 136,992 S.W.2d at 769. Prolixin, also known as
Fluphenazine, is used to treat disordered thoughts. Its side effects include:
[Bilurred vision, breast enlargement in men or women[;] breast milk in
women who are not breast-feeding[;] chest pain, fast or irregular heartbeat[;]
confusion[;] restlessness[;] dark yellow or brown urine[;] difficulty breathing
or swallowing[;] dizziness or fainting spells[;] drooling[;] shaking[;j
movement difficulty (shuffling walk) or rigidity[;] fever, chills, sore throat[;]
hot, dry skin[;] unable to sweat[;] involuntary or uncontrollable movements
of the eyes, mouth, head, arms, and legs[;] menstrual changes, puffing
cheeks, smacking lips, or worm-like movements of the tongue[;] seizures
(convulsions), slurred speech[;] stomach area pain[;] sweating, unusual
weakness or tiredness[;] unusual bleeding or bruising[;] [and] yellowing of
skin or eyes.
MSN Health Channel, Fluphenazine (visited Mar. 28, 2000)
<http://content.health.msn.com/content/asset/cpdrug_803>. Cogentin, also known as
Benztropine, is used to treat movement-related side effects of psychotropic
medications, such as tremor, rigid muscles and difficulties in walking, talking,
balancing and swallowing. Its side effects include:
[Algitation, nervousness[;] blurred vision, or other eye problems[;]
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this time, Singleton lost his final round of appeals, and Governor
Huckabee set the execution date of March I1, 1998.' 9 Consequently,
Singleton filed a complaint and petition for declaratory judgment and
petition for issuance of all writs and orders necessary to enforce in the
Jefferson County Circuit Court."0 Singleton hoped to receive a stay of
execution from the trial court."' He also sought a stay in the Arkansas
Supreme Court.82 Following the denial of Singleton's petition for
declaratory judgment by the circuit court, 3 Singleton appealed the
decision to the Arkansas Supreme Court, arguing that the trial court
erred in finding that his involuntary medication was appropriate."
Specifically, Singleton claimed that he was "artificially" competent to
be executed by way of the forced medication in violation of his state and
federal due process rights, his right to be free from cruel and unusual
punishment, his right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures, and his right to privacy and autonomy.85
The Arkansas Supreme Court rejected his argument and held that
"regardless of whether an execution date was set," the state's actions
were justified in light of Harper, for the good of both the prisoner and
confusion, memory, loss, slurred speech, hallucinations (seeing or hearing
things that are not really there)[;] decrease in sweating[;] difficulty
breathing[;] difficulty swallowing[J] dizziness or fainting[;] fast, or irregular
heartbeat (palpitations)[;] pain or difficulty passing urine[;] vomiting[;] [and]
weakness or tiredness.
MSN Health Channel, Benztropine (visited Mar. 28, 2000)
<http://content.health.msn.com/content/asset/cpdrug_265>.
79. See Singleton, 338 Ark. at 136-37, 992 S.W.2d at 769.
80. See id. at 137, 992 S.W.2d at 769.
81. Seeid.,992S.W.2dat769.
82. See id. Singleton was granted a stay by the Arkansas Supreme Court in
Singleton v. Norris, 332 Ark. 196, 964 S.W.2d 366 (1998).
83. The trial court found that Singleton was competent at the time of the hearing
and that he had failed to "'conclusively' prove[] . . . that [he] is incompetent to be
executed without his medication." Singleton, 338 Ark. at 138, 992 S.W.2d at 770 (no
citation provided by the court).
84. See id. at 137, 992 S.W.2d at 769.
85. See id., 992 S.W.2d at 769. Singleton asserted these rights under the Fourth
Amendment, and Article 2, section 15 ofthe Arkansas Constitution, and Arkansas Code
Annotated section 16-90-506. See id., 992 S.W.2d at 769. Article 2, section 15 of the
Arkansas Constitution provides:
The right of the people of this State to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be
violated; and no warrant shall issue except upon probable cause, supported
by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the person or thing to be seized.
ARK. CONST. art. II, § 15. It is almost identical to the Fourth Amendment's provision.
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the institution. 6 Notably, the court stated, "the involuntary administra-
tion of medication remains appropriate as long as appellant is alive and
is either a potential danger to himself or others.""7 The court explicitly
relied on the state's expressed intention for forcing the medication, for
Singleton's "own good" and the institution's, as contrasted with any
intention to make him competent to be executed.8 The court also
focused on the fact that Singleton had never challenged the appropriate-
ness of the forced medication under Harper, i.e., that he was dangerous
to himself or others and that the medication was in his medical interest. 9
Stating that Singleton had never requested a Ford hearing while off his
medication, the court declared that Singleton had failed to prove his
incompetence."
Because Singleton failed to challenge Harper and did not appeal the
Medication Review Panel's decision to forcibly medicate him, the court
held that the State had met its burden under Harper to prove the
necessity of forced medication at the Panel hearing.9 Further, because
Singleton never requested a Ford hearing and thus had no proof of his
incompetence to be executed, Harper controlled the present case and the
mere "collateral effect of the involuntary medication rendering him
competent to understand the nature and reason for his execution is
therefore no violation of any due process law." '9 2 Justice Thornton
disagreed with the majority's opinion, noting that under Harper,
medication which renders a prisoner competent to be executed cannot
be in the prisoner's medical interest.93
V. CONCLUSION
Although it had seemed that mentally ill death row inmates were
protected from being forcibly medicated solely for execution purposes,
it is now clear that the Arkansas Supreme Court has found an "out" in
Singleton v. Norris. In order to escape the rationales of the Louisiana and
South Carolina cases, the State of Arkansas only needed to provide
some other justification for the use of medication forced upon a death
row inmate. In Singleton's case, the state argued that the safety of the
86. See Singleton, 338 Ark. at 138, 992 S.W.2d at 769.
87. Id., 992 S.W.2d at 769.
88. See id., 992 S.W.2d at 770.
89. See id., 992 S.W.2d at 770.
90. See id. at 139, 992 S.W.2d at 770.
91. See id., 992 S.W.2d at 770.
92. Singleton, 338 Ark. at 139, 992 S.W.2d at 770.
93. See id. at 139-40, 992 S.W.2d at 770-71 (Thornton, J., dissenting).
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institution required him to be medicated; the Arkansas Supreme Court
even stated that the medication was necessary for his "own good" and
appropriate under Washington v. Harper. This statement by the court,
however, allows the state to contradict the principle of Washington v.
Harper and forcibly medicate an inmate contrary to his medical interest.
Although the State of Arkansas maintains that its intent is to medicate
Singleton because it is in his medical interest, the real effect of such
medication is his execution. How, in light of the precedential caselaw
surrounding this issue, can the state proceed with involuntarily
medicating Singleton, knowing that it is facilitating his execution? How
can the court accept that medication which ultimately results in a
prisoner's death is in his medical interest and appropriate under
Harper?' Is the State of Arkansas making the argument that the state's
interest in prison safety overrides the prisoner's own medical interests?
And if so, would it not be cruel and unusual punishment for a state to
put its needs above the medical interests of the prisoner? These are the
questions that the United States Supreme Court refused to answer when
it denied certiorari. Hopefully, the Court will notice this contradiction
of its mandates for forcible medication and examine the Arkansas
Supreme Court's analysis or the reasoning of any other court which
adopts the same position. The ultimate question should be what is in the
prisoner's best interest: to allow him to remain mentally ill, or to
medicate him, thereby temporarily curing his mental illness, but leading
to his ultimate destruction?95
Rebecca A. Miller-Rice"
94. Again, this is precisely the position that Justice Thornton takes in his
dissenting opinion in Singleton.
95. Perhaps one way of solving this problem is that suggested by Doctors
Freedman and Halpern: promote the Maryland way of dealing with incompetent death
row inmates whereby any inmate requiring treatment has his sentence commuted to life
without parole. See Freedman & Halpern, supra note 35, at 187 (citing MD. CODE ANN.
[Crimes and Punishments] art. 27, § 75A (1987)).
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